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THE RIGHTS OF THE INSANE OFFENDER
The plea of insanity as a defense to a criminal charge, as a
bar to prosecution, and as a means of avoiding punishment is one
of the oldest and most abused contentions in our judicial system.
The settled policy in favor of bringing to justice those who trans-
gress the precepts of the state has given way in certain situations
to a less distinct policy favoring liberation of the mentally ill from
the procedural and penal rigors of the criminal law. To give effect
to the latter policy, courts and legislatures have provided sub-
stantive and remedial safeguards for the accused person whose
mental integrity is in doubt or clearly deficient. The constitutional
mandate of due process' has played a part in defining these pro-
tective principles. Recent legislative and judicial developments,
notably on the federal level, suggest a review of the methods of
determining sanity at various stages of a criminal prosecution and
the effect such determination has on subsequent proceedings.
I. INSANITY AT THE TIME OF THE OFFENSE
A. Substantive Right
The mental condition of an accused becomes important initially
at the time the acts involved took place. Insanity is a defense to
crime because its existence negatives the two essential elements of a
crime, the act and the intent.2 An insane person can neither form the
criminal intent, nor, since he cannot control the course of his
actions, can he commit a criminal act.3
The classic tests of insanity at the time of the offense were
enunciated more than a century ago in McNaghten's Case:4 (1)
a defendant was not insane at the time of the offense unless at that
time he either did not know right from wrong, or else did not know
that the act he was performing was wrong; (2) an insane delusion
is no defense unless the defendant believed that the delusion repre-
sented reality where such reality would itself be a defense, and his
act was the direct result of such misconception.5 While these
principles have been adopted without modification in a number of
American jurisdictions,' another group of states has added to this
1. U. S. Const. Amend. V; Amend. XIV, § 1.
2. See Miller, Criminal Law § 35 (1934).
3. See Davis v. United States, 160 U. S. 469, 484 (1895) ; See 1 Whar-
ton, Criminal Law § 49 (12th ed. 1932). However, evidence om mental de-
ficiency short of "legal insanity" is not relevant to the question of pre-
meditation and deliberation. Fisher v. United States, 328 U. S. 463 (1946).
4. 10 Cl. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
5. Ibid. On the effect of insane delusions, see United States v. Chis-
holm. 153 Fed. 808 (C.C. S.D. Ala. 1907); Guiteau's Case, 10 Fed. 161
(C.C. D.C. 1882).
6. See Miller, Criminal Law § 37 (1934).
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test an "irresistible impulse" qualification, which excuses the
offender if at the time of the act he had lost control over his action
so that, even knowing right from wrong, he could not restrain him-
self from inflicting the harm.
7
The Supreme Court has never determined whether or not the
right to be absolved from criminal responsibility is a part of sub-
stantive due process of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the United States Constitution. The underlying question
is whether this "right" is "fundamental"" and "implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty." The federal courts have said that "hu-
manity and justice" require that a defendant be permitted to raise
the defense of insanity,10 and it would seem to be a simple matter to
harmonize this language with the accepted test of due process.
The highest courts of Mississippi" and Washington'2 have held
that legislation abolishing the defense of insanity violated the due
process provisions of their state constitutions.
Most states, however, provide specifically by statute that a lunatic
or insane person cannot be found guilty of a crime. 13 Consequently,
the serious problems of due process arise in the area of procedure
rather than in matters of substance.
B. Procedural Rights
Generally, no special plea is necessary in order to raise the issue
of insanity,:4 and evidence of this issue may be introduced under
a general plea of not guilty.'5 On the other hand, a plea of guilty
admits mental competency at the time of the offensel:i
Since a sound mental state is essential to criminal responsibility,
the issue of sanity at the time of the offense is ordinarily tried by
the same jury which passes on the other elements of the criminal
charge, 17 and the defendant is not entitled to a separate trial on this
7. Ibid. The federal courts have accepted this modification. See United
States v. Pennsylvania, 90 F. Supp. 208, 211 (W.D. Pa. 1950) ; United States
v. Fore, 38 F. Supp. 140, 141 (S.D. Cal. 1941).
8. Phyle v. Duffy, 334 U. S. 431, 439 (1948) ; United States v. Baldi,
192 F. 2d 540, 544 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. granted, 20 U. S. L. Week 3251 (U. S.
March 24, 1952).
9. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325 (1937); Rochin v. Cali-
fornia, 72 Sup. Ct. 205, 208 (1952).
10. See Davis v. United States, 160 U. S. 469, 493 (1895); United
States v. McGlue, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,679 at 1094 (C.C.D. fass. 1851).
11. Sinclair v. State, 161 Miss. 142, 132 So. 581 (1931).
12. State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 Pac. 1020 (1910).
13. See Glueck, Mental Disorder and the Criminal Law 504-643 (1927).
14. See Miller, Criminal Law § 40 (1934).
15. United States v. Fore, 38 F. Supp. 140 (S.D. Cal. 1941).
16. See United States v. Pennsylvania, 89 F. Supp. 636, 641 (W.D. Pa.
1950).
17. See United States v. Lawrence, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,576 at 886
(1835) ; State v. Hockett, 238 P. 2d 539, 543 (Kan. 1951).
[Vol. 36:933
NOTES
issue by a jury drawn for that specific purpose.' At common law
the jury trial could not be waived.19
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution have raised the common law rule providing for jury
trial of the insanity defense to the level of a constitutional mandate.
Therefore, unless there is an intelligent waiver,2 0 the determination
must be made by a jury.21 The reports of competent medical exami-
ners can be of no more than persuasive influence,22 and attempts to
make them conclusive have been held to be unconstitutional usurpa-
tions of the function of the jury.23
Similarly, whether or not the insanity defense is a part of
substantive due process, a defendant who properly raises the issue
is entitled to procedural due process in its determination.2 4 This
would include the right to counsel, 25 the right to a trial before an
impartial tribunal,26 and such other rights as "fundamental prin-
ciples" prescribe.2 7
If the suggestions of insanity at the time of the offense is not
raised until after conviction, it may not be availed of unless it can
be shown that the contention is based on evidence which was not
available at an earlier time, and which might have affected the
verdict. If the defendant is not satisfied with the decision of the
court or jury with respect to his defense of insanity, he may pro-
ceed by appeal to secure a review of this determination."' Since
an erroneous disposition of this defense does not affect the court's
jurisdiction, it may not be reviewed under a writ of habeas corpus.2 9
II. INSANITY AFTER THE OFFENSE BUT BEFORE CONVICTION
A. Substantive Right
Since an insane person is unable to act in his own defense and
is considered to be helpless before the court,30 the universal rule
18. United States v. Fore, 38 F. Supp. 140 (S.D. Cal. 1941); see
Plessman v. State, 130 Neb. 758, 760, 266 N. W. 629, 631 (1936).
19. Wilson v. State, 16 Ark. 601 (1855).
20. Adams v. United States, 317 U. S. 269 (1942).
21. See State v. Eisenhardt, 185 La. 308, 348, 349, 169 So. 417, 430
(1936).
22. See Tatum v. United States, 190 F. 2d 612, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
23. State v. Lange, 168 La. 958, 123 So. 639 (1929).
24. United States v. Baldi, 192 F. 2d 540, 544 (3d Cir. 1951), cert.
granted, 20 U. S. L. Week 3251 (U. S. March 24, 1952).
25. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932).
26. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510 (1927).
27. See Phyle v. Duffy, 334 U. S. 431, 439 (1948).
28. See Holloway v. United States, 148 F. 2d 665, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
29. United States v. Ragen, 167 F. 2d 543 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 335
U. S. 830 (1948) ; Whitney v. Zerbst, 62 F. 2d 970 (10th Cir. 1933).
30. See Forthoffer v. Swope, 103 F. 2d 707, 709 (9th Cir. 1939) ; People
v. Ross, 101 N. E. 2d 112, 116 (2d Dist. Ill. 1951) ; see 4 BI. Comm. *395.
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is that one in such a state cannot plead to an indictment or be tried."1
Consequently, when it appears before or during trial that an accused
person is suffering from a mental defect, further proceedings are
suspended pending restoration. of the defendant to a competent con-
dition.3 2 Insanity at this stage, however, is not a defense to the
criminal charge, but rather a collateral issue involving the defen-
dant's fitness for trial.3 Upon recovery, the prosecution of the indict-
ment will resume in the usual manner.
The test of present insanity is whether or not the accused is
mentally capable of understanding the nature and gravity of the
charge against him, and of rationally presenting a defense or
assisting his counsel in such presentation.3 4 The burden is on the
defendant to establish incompetency.3 5 In determining whether or
not the defendant can understand the charge against him, the
nature and complexity of the offense are relevant.30 One court has
suggested that the entry of a plea of guilty by counsel implies a
belief that his client is sane,-- but this is of little relevance, since
the issue concerns the fact of competency.
The trial of a mentally incompetent person is a denial of due
process.38 The sovereign power of the state to proceed against an
insane person charged with a felony"9 must yield to the fundamental
right of an accused to be present, mentally as well as physically,
at his own trial.40 The court has a duty to determine the defen-
dant's sanity before it accepts a plea of guilty.41 If he is unsound at
31. See Smoot, Law of Insanity § 452 (1929).
32. See United States v. Boylen, 41 F. Supp. 724 (D. Ore. 1941) ; see
People v. Ah Ying, 42 Cal. 18, 21 (1871).
33. See McIntosh v. Pescor, 175 F. 2d 95, 98 (6th Cir. 1949) ; People v.
Cornelius, 332 Ill. App. 271, 275, 74 N. E. 2d 900, 901 (2d Dist. 1947).
34. Freeman v. People, 4 Denio 9 (N.Y. 1847); see Moss v. Hunter,
167 F. 2d 683, 685 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U. S. 860 (1948).
35. See People v. Cornelius, 332 Ill. App. 271, 274, 74 N. E. 2d 900, 901
(2d Dist. 1947). But if a defendant has been previously adjudicated insane, he
has the advantage of a continuing presumption of insanity. See Frame v. Hud-
speth, 109 F. 2d 356, 358 (10th Cir. 1939), rez'd on other ground, 309 U. S.
632 (1940) ; People v. Field, 238 P. 2d 1052, 1054 (2d Dist. Cal. 1951). But
see Commonwealth v. Ashe, 364 Pa. 93, 107-108, 71 A. 2d 107, 114-115,
cert. denied, 340 U. S. 812 (1950).
36. See United States v. Harriman, 4 F. Supp. 186, 188 (S.D. N.Y.
1933).
37. See Commomvealth v. Ashe, 364 Pa. 93, 106, 71 A. 2d 107, 114,
cert. denied, 340 U. S. 812 (1950).
38. Youtsey v. United States, 97 Fed. 937 (6th Cir. 1899) ; see United
States v. Ragen, 149 F. 2d 948, 950 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U. S. 791
(1945).
39. See Higgins v. McGrath, 98 F. Supp. 670, 674 (W.D. Mo. 1951).
40. See Moss v. Hunter, 167 F. 2d 683, 685 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
334 U. S. 860 (1948) ; Ashley v. Pescor, 147 F. 2d 318, 319 (8th Cir. 1945).
41. See Robinson v. Johnston, 50 F. Supp. 774, 776 (N.D. Cal. 1943),
aff'd 144 F. 2d 392 (6th Cir. 1944), aff'd 324 U. S. 282 (1945).
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any stage of the proceedings, the court is without jurisdiction to
decide the cause, and any judgment entered or sentence imposed
is therefore void.42
While a number of states have legislatively emphasized this
prohibition against trying a madman,43 'the remaining states and
the federal system have found sufficient insurance against the
wrongful deprivation of the accused's liberty in the common law
and the Constitution.
B. Procedure
The manner of raising the issue of present insanity before and
during trial is immaterial.4 4 Although ordinarily the issue is raised
at the time of arraignment, the plea may be heard subsequent to
that time.'5
The trial court has the ultimate responsibility for determining the
defendant's fitness for trial,"6 and no court other than the one in
which the indictment is pending can decide this question.47 The
choice of the mode of trial is within the sound discretion of the trial
court,4' but the court cannot act arbitrarily, and the record should
evidence an exercise of discretion.-' When the question is raised
before trial, the four alternatives commonly resorted to by the
courts5 O in absence of statute are (1) determination by the court
42. Honaker v. Cox, 51 F. Supp. 829 (W.D. Mlo. 1943) (insanity at time
of trial); see People v. Ragen, 55 F. Supp. 143, 145 (N.D. Ill. 1944), rev'd
on other grounds. 149 F. 2d 948 (7th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U. S.
791 (1946). But cf. Whelchel v. McDonald, 176 F. 2d 260, 262 (5th Cir. 1949).
It is not double jeopardy to subject the defendant to a second trial after the
first conviction has been invalidated because of his insanity. Robinson v.
United States, 144 F. 2d 392 (6th Cir. 1944), aff'd 324 U. S. 282 (1945).
43. Cal. Pen. Code § 1367 (1949) ; N. Y. Pen. Code § 1120. See Glueck,
Mental Disorder and the Criminal Law, 504-643 (1927).
44. See Youtsey v. United States, 97 Fed. 937, 941 (6th Cir. 1899);
People v. Aparicio, 241 P. 2d 221, 223 (Cal. 1952).
45. See Youtsey v. United States, 97 Fed. 937, 940, 941 (6th Cir. 1899);
Weihofen, Insanity as a Defense in Criminal Law 255 (1933). But cf. Ogles
v. State, 214 Ark. 581, 217 S. W. 2d 259 (1949), where the court found
a waiver of a mental examination.
46. See United States v. Harriman, 4 F. Supp. 186, 187 (S.D. N.Y.
193. See Higgins v. McGrath, 98 F. Supp. 670, 674 (W.D. Mo. 1951);
Ex parte Charlton, 185 Fed. 880, 883 (C.C.D. N.J. 1911), aff'd 229 U. S.
447 (1913).
48. United States v. Boylen, 41 F. Supp. 724 (D. Ore. 1941); see
Fralick v. State, 25 Ariz. 4, 15, 212 Pac. 377, 380 (1923) ; see 9 Cyc. Fed.
Proc. § 4236 (2d ed. 1943).
49. Youtsey v. United States, 97 Fed. 937 6th Cir. 1899). But cf. People
v. Kirby, 15 Cal. App. 264, 114 Pac. 794 (1st Dist. 1911), where the denial
of a motion was held to be equivalent to an express finding of sanity, and
United States v. Baldi, 192 F. 2d 540 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. granted, 20, U. S. L.
Week 3251 (U. S. March 24, 1952), where the court found no prejudice in
the denial of the opportunity to have the court exercise this discretion.
50. See United States v. Harriman, 4 F. Supp. 186 (S.D. N.Y. 1933).
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itself, (2) delivery of the defendant to a mental institution for a
period of time for observation and report, (3) examination by a
panel of medical experts,51 and (4) a hearing before a jury.
If a hearing is held, with or without a jury, the accused, since
he must prove incompetency, has the right to open and close the
case and to cross-examine witnesses.5 2 If an examination by a
panel of experts is ordered, the court may adopt the report of the
examiners as final. However, it is not bound to do so,53 and the
courts have, on occasion, injudiciously rejected the findings of the
experts and substituted their own impressions on the matter."4
While in the rare instances in which a jury trial is used the issue
usually is given to a special jury,55 any jury verdict on this question
is of only advisory effect.56 If present insanity is not raised until the
trial has begun, the issue will be submitted to the trial jury for a
special finding.
5 7
A finding of present insanity is conclusive only as of the time
of investigation and is by no means final.5 s The trial court may at
any time order the defendant to be delivered up for trial,55 and any
court of competent jurisdiction can order a new inquiry if a sub-
stantial doubt of the continued insanity of the defendant is raised. "
A defendant found insane prior to conviction has no right to a
hearing or a jury trial on the question of his return to sanity."'
Although due process may require notice to the defendant and an
opportunity for him to be heard,6 2 it does not require a hearing in
51. In a recent murder prosecution in Minnesota, the court ordered sepa-
rate examinations and reports by two sets of experts. State v. Sandvik, Crimi-
nal No. 42174, 4th Dist. Minn., April, 1952.
52. See United States v. Boylen, 41 F. Supp. 724, 726 (D. Ore. 1941).
53. See United States v. McLeod, 83 F. Supp. 372, 373 (E.D. Pa. 1949);
United States v. Harriman, 4 F. Supp. 186, 187 (S.D. N.Y. 1933).
54. See Higgins v. McGratf , 98 F. Supp. 670 (W.D. Mo. 1951). In
United States v. Gundelfinger, 98 F. Supp. 630 (W.D. Pa 1951), the court
rejected the findings of the experts, asserting that they had misunderstood
the purpoe of the examination, but it refused to order a new examination.
55. 9 Cyc. Fed. Proc. § 4236 (2d ed. 1943).
56. See United States v. Boylen, 41 F. Supp. 724, 725 (D. Ore. 1941)
United States v. Harriman, 4 F. Supp. 186, 187 (S.D. N.Y. 1933).
57. See Youtsey v. United S:ates, 97 Fed. 937, 941 (6th Cir. 1899).
58. See Higgins v. McGrath, 98 F. Supp. 670, 673, 674 (W.D. Mo.
1951) ; Ex parte Charlton, 185 Fed. 880, 884 (C.C.D. N.J. 1911), aff'd
229 U. S. 447 (1913).
59. In re Buchanan, 129 Cal. 330, 61 Pac. 1120 (1900) ; cf. People v.
Elder, 104 N. E. 2d 120 (1st Dist. Ill. 1952).
60. See Higgins v. MfcGrath, 98 F. Supp. 670 (W.D. Mo. 1951).
61. See Haislip v. United States, 129 F. 2d 53, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
62. Walters v. McKinnis, 221 Fed. 746 (W.D. Pa. 1915). The court
in United States v. Jackson, 16 F. Supp. 126, 130 (M.D. Pa. 1936), suggested
that this case was overruled by Hammon v. Hill, 228 Fed. 999 (W.D. Pa.
1915). But the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has since
expressed its opinion that the Hammon case was erroneously decided. Barry
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any particular manner at any particular stage of the proceedings.63
It has been held that where a statute provides for the appointment
of an impartial medical examiner to investigate and report to the
court on the mental condition of an accused, the Constitution does
not require the appointment of additional expert assistance to aid
the defense in the preparation of its own case.6 4 But it is not clear
whether or not due process requires court-appointed experts for
an indigent defendant when no other psychiatric testimony is
available to him.60 On the other hand, it is settled that a compulsory
mental examination of a defendant does not infringe on his con-
stitutional privilege against self-incrimination.6 0
A recent decision of the Municipal Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia extended the constitutional right to the
appointment of counsel to a pre-trial lunacy inquisition. However,
this decision seems to have been based on a misconception of the
nature of the inquiry as a "semi-criminal" proceeding. 6 Although
the right to appointment of counsel is normally associated only with
criminal proceedings,9 it is conceivable that fundamental unfair-
ness might result from subjecting the accused to an examination
on this fact issue without the benefit of an advocate prepared to
present his position. If the court's denomination of the proceeding
as "semi-criminal" is accepted, a persuasive argument can be made
that the defendant is deprived of future liberty unconstitutionally
if counsel is denied him.
On the other hand, a person is entitled to retain counsel at all
v. Hall, 98 F. 2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1938), in which the court struck down a civil
commitment statute which failed to provide for notice and an opportunity to
defend.
63. See United States v. Baldi, 192 F. 2d 540, 545 (3d Cir. 1951), cert.
granted, 20 U. S. L. Week 3251 (U. S. March 24, 1952).
64. United States v. Baldi, 192 F. 2d 540 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. granted,
20 U. S. L. Week 3251 (U. S. March 24, 1952) ; MLcGarty v. O'Brien, 188
F. 2d 151 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U. S. 928 (1951).
65. See McGarty v. O'Brien, 188 F. 2d 151, 155, 157 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 341 U. S. 928 (1951). Cf. People v. Pugh, 409 Ill. 584, 588, 100
N. E. 2d 909, 911 (1951), where the authority of the trial court to appoint
an expert is denied. The equal protection question has been recognized but
not resolved. See AfcGarty v. O'Brien, supra at 158; United States v. Warden
of Philadelphia County Prison, 87 F. Supp. 339, 352 (E.D. Pa. 1949) (dis-
senting opinion).
66. State v. Myers, 67 S. E. 2d 506 (S.C. 1951) ; ef. United States v.
Hohn, 101 F. Supp. 17, 18 (W.D. Pa. 1951).
67. Evans v. United States, 83 A. 2d 876 (D.C. 1951). The court also
held that one who has been classified as prima facie insane cannot waive
counsel.
68. Id. at 880.
69. See Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U. S. 437 (1948); Melanson v.
O'Brien, 191 F. 2d 963 (1st Cir. 1951).
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stages of the prosecution of the indictment against him."0 In addi-
tion, the federal constitution requires the appointment of counsel
by the court in all federal cases where the defendant is unable to
procure legal assistance himselE.7 1 Since an insane person obviously
cannot be depended upon to retain his own counsel, the court must
provide counsel for him from and after the time of arraignment. 72
Moreover, since waiver of counsel at trial can only be made "intel-
ligently", any attempted waiver by a person who is thought to be
insane, or is later proven to be so, is ineffective."
A considerable number of states have prescribed by statute a
procedure for the determination of pre-trial sanity.7' Usually the
statutes provide for a sanity determination whenever the question
is raised, whether it is raised by the prosecution, the defense, or
the court itself.73 But it remains within the court's discretion to
determine whether there is a sufficient question to justify the in-
vocation of the statutory procedure.
70
While some of the statutes call for a preliminary examination
by experts to determine the necessity for a hearing on the sanity
issue,77 others direct that a jury shall be impanelled immediately
to hear the question. 78 In some states there are statutes providing
for a procedure to determine whether the defendant is restored and
70. Hawk v. Olson, 326 U. S. 271 (1945). The right to counsel includes
the right to a private consultation with the defendant. Ex partc Ochse, 238
P. 2d 561 (Cal. 1951).
71. Tomldns v. Missouri, 32,; U. S. 485 (1945); see Betts v. Brady,
316 U. S. 455, 464 (1942). There is no duty for the court to provide counsel
before the defendant is brought into court. See Commonwealth v. McNeil,
104 N. E. 2d 153, 155 (Mass. 1952).
72. Hawk v. Olson, 326 U. S. 271 (1945). But cf. United States v. Baldi.
192 F. 2d 540 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. granted, 20 U. S. L. Week 3251 (U. S.
March 24, 1952), where the court held that failure to provide counsel at the
time of a plea of not guilty by a defendant whose mental condition was ques-
tionable was not unconstitutional, in absence of a finding of prejudice to de-
dendant's case.
73. Honaker v. Cox, 51 F. Supp. 829 (W.D. Mo. 1943); Robinson v.
Johnston, 50 F. Supp. 774 (N.D. Cal. 1943), aff'd 144 F. 2d 392 (6th Cir.
1944), aff'd 324 U. S. 282 (1945).
74. Ark. Stat. § 43-1301 (Supp. 1949); Cal. Pen. Code §§ 1368, 1369
(1949); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.961' (Supp. 1951) ; Miss. Code Ann. § 2573
(1942); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 122-84- (Supp. 1951). See A. L. I., Code Crim.
Proc. § 307 (1930) ; see Glueck, Mental Disorder and the Criminal Law
504-643 (1927).
75. Glueck, op. cit. supra note 74, at 504-643.
76. See United States v. Baldi, 192 F. 2d 540, 545 (1951), cert. granted,
20 U. S. L. Week 3251 (U. S. March 24, 1952) ; Robinson v. Commonwealth,
243 S. W. 2d 673, 674 (Ky. 1951).
77. Glueck, op. cit. supra note 74, at 504-643.
78. Cal. Pen. Code § 1368 (1949) ; Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 38, § 593 1935).
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ready for trial. Most of these require no more than the certification of
the hospital authorities. 79
In Massachusetts the "most far-sighted piece of legislation yet
passed on this subject"' 0 has been in operation for a quarter of a
century. The famed Briggs Law,81 which provides for the routine
mental examination of all serious offenders within the statutory
classification before the trial of the indictment, has met with great
success. The law has rid the Massachusetts courts of the plague of
the "battle of the experts" which too often accompanies the trial
of the sanity issue, by providing for competent detached observation
and diagnosis. It has also greatly minimized the abuse of the in-
sanity plea, and it has taken the responsibility for recognizing the
exterior manifestations of an internal defect out of the hands of the
court and put it in the hands of those qualified to evaluate such
symptoms.
In 1949, Congress added sections 4244-4248 to the United
States Criminal CodeA2' Section 4244, which deals specifically with
pre-trial insanity, was adopted for the express purpose of making
uniform the practice in the federal courts.83 This long overdue
legislation follows the general pattern of procedure outlined in the
state statutes, with provision for a preliminary examination by at
least one psychiatrist upon suggestion of the prosecution, the defense,
or the court, to be followed by a hearing in the event that indications
of incompetancy are reported. Section 4246 provides that a post-
conviction finding of mental incompetancy during trial shall operate
to vacate the judgment and grant a new trial.8" Unfortunately,
however, the new law does not provide for the determination of
the prisoner's recovery and it thus falls short of complete uniformity.
In spite of the specifications now imposed on the federal courts
as contrasted with the liberality of the former procedure, the courts
have held that the new legislation is simply declaratory of the
common law, and its constitutionality has been affirmed. 5
Unless provided by statute, the defendant has no right of
79. Cal. Pen. Code § 1372 (1949) ; D. C. Code § 24-303 (1941). But the
court may order the prisoner delivered up if there is an abuse of discretion.
See Wagner v. White, 38 App. D. C. 554, 558 (1912).
80. Glueck, Psychiatric Examination of Persons Accused of Crime, 36
Yale L. J. 632, 635 (1927).
81. Mass. Ann. Laws c. 123, § 100A (1949). A discussion of this law
in operation is found in Overholser, The Massachusetts Procedure Relative
to the Sanity of Defendants in Crhninal Cases, 19 Minn. L. Rev. 308 (1935).
82. 18 U. S. C. §§ 4244-4248 (Supp. 1951).
83. See United States v. Gundelfinger, 98 F. Supp. 630, 631 (W.D. Pa.
1951); see U. S. C. Cong. Serv. 1928 (1949).
84. 18 U. S. C. § 4246 (Supp. 1951).
85. See Higgins v. McGrath, 98 F. Supp. 670, 674 (W.D. Mo. 1951).
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appeal from the result of the collateral inquiry into his sanity.80
Neither the common law nor constitutional due process require
that a defendant be given more than one hearing., M\Ioreover, the
order made at the insanity hearing is only interlocutory and not
final, and thus it lacks one of the esential elements of appealability. 8
Where a statutory appeal is allowed, the error most frequently
asserted is an abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying a
sanity inquiry. The appellate courts, however, have found this
discretion to be very broad, and have refused to find abuse in the
absence of a strong showing,8 9 although a reversal is in order if an
abuse of discretion clearly appears from the record. 00
III. POST-CONVICTION INSANITY
The most difficult problems arise when the effect which insanity
should have on punishment is considered. While the trial of an
insane man may be a mockery, and his conviction an injustice, the
punishment of one who cannot appreciate his plight or save him-
self may well be an atrocity. Because of the special difficulties in-
volved when the death sentence is imposed, post-conviction insanity
in capital cases can best be treated separately from the situations in
which some lesser penalty is exacted.
A. Capital Cases
At common law, it was regarded as fundamental that no in-
sane person could be executed. " If it was found that a condemned
prisoner was so unsound that he could not appreciate the gravity
of his situation or understand why he was being punished, he could
not be put to death.9 2 Today, every American state sustains this
policy, either by statutory direction or by judicial adoption.0 3
86. People v. Bechtel, 297 Ill. 312, 130 N. E. 728 (1921) ; Freeman v.
People, 4 Denio 9 (N.Y. 1847).
87. See People v. Cornelius, 332 Il1. App. 271, 275, 276, 74 N. E. 2d
900, 901, 902 (2d Dist 1947). But see Walters v. McKinnis, 221 Fed. 746, 750
(1915).
88. See People v. Cornelius, 332 Ill. App. 271, 277, 74 N. E. 2d 900,
902 (2d Dist. 1947).
89. See People v. Aparicio, 241 P. 2d 221, 223 (Cal. 1952) ; Robinson
v. Commonwealth, 243 S. W. 2d 673, 674 (Ky. 1951). It has been held that a
refusal to hear any evidence is not an abuse of discretion. United States v.
Baldi, 192 F. 2d 540 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. granted, 20 U. S. L. Week 3251
(U. S. March 24, 1952).
90. People v. Aparicio, 241 P. 2d 221 (Cal. 1952).
91. 1 Hale's P. C. §35 (1847).
92. See People v. Lawson, 178 Cal. 722, 727, 174 Pac. 885. 888 (1918);
State v. Helm, 69 Ark. 167, 173, 61 .. IV. 915, 917 (1901) ; see Weihofen, In-
sanity as a Defense in Criminal Law 386 (1933).
93. See, e.g., Cal. Pen. Code § 1367 (1949) ; Colo. State. Ann. c. 48
§ 7 (Supp. 1951). See also Drinan, The State and Insane Condemned Crinz-
inals, 12 Jurist 92, 93 (1952).
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NOTES
The Supreme Court has not made clear whether or not due
process forbids the execution of an insane convict. In the leading
case of Solesbee v. Balkom9 4 the majority did not reach this question.
Solesbee was convicted of murder in Georgia and sentenced to
death by electrocution. His post-sentence plea of insanity was
disposed of pursuant to a Georgia statute by the governor on the
recommendation of an examining board of three physicians. The
Court held only that there was no violation of procedural due
process. Justice Frankfurter in dissent insisted that substantive due
process would not permit the execution of an insane person, and
took the position that procedural due process required a fair and
open hearing to determine the fundamental question of the defen-
dant's mental capacity Thus the only clear statement as to the
existence of an underlying substantive right is that of a lone dis-
senter in a case decided on a question of procedure. Moreover, the
analogy made to the power of reprieve by Justice Black, writing
for the Court,"& supports an inference that a stay of execution
because of insanity is purely an act of grace. However, the fact
that both the majority and the dissent felt it necessary to test the
constitutionality of the procedure suggests that there is a right
which must be protected by procedural safeguards.
While the contention that the execution of a mental incompetent
is cruel and unusual punishment within the terms of the Eighth
Amendment has not been thoroughly considered by the Supreme
Court, 7 the rationales set forth in Louisiana v. Res-weber 8 can be
logically extended to negate this argument. The prohibition was
there said to apply to the method of punishment, rather than the
amount of suffering which the prisoner must endure. The Court
felt that in absence of a purpose to inflict unnecessary pain, there
is no violation of this constitutional principle. Since the method
is not an issue in the post-conviction insanity dilema, there appears
to be no basis for constitutional challenge on this ground.
Little, if any, support can be mustered from penological theories
for the execution of a lunatic. Unfortunately, punishment today is
still based primarily on a theory of revenge,-" but society cannot
avenge itself in any sense by punishing one who can no longer
94. 339 U. S. 9 (1950).
95. Id. at 14 et seq. But see People v. Riley, 37 Cal. 2d 510, 514, 235
P. 2d 381, 384 (1951).
96. 339 U. S. at 11-12 (1950). On the power of reprieve generally, see
Ex parte United States, 242 U. S. 27 (1916).
97. See Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U. S. 9, 11 (1950).
98. 329 U. S. 459 (1947).
99. Taft, Criminology 317 (rev. ed. 1950).
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understand pain. Again, the deterrent effect of taking the life of a
madman is highly questionable, although it has been suggested that
the prospect of being executed, whether rational or not, might well
give pause to a potential offender.100
The policy arguments in favor of withholding the substantive
right are few. The strongest point that can be made is that "squeam-
ishness" should not prevent the taking of a life which by hypothesis
has been declared forfeit. 101 Yet the courts and legislatures of every
state have been unimpressed by such reasoning. On the other hand,
the arguments in favor of the recognition of the right are numerous,
though somewhat vulnerable. First, in view of the fact that convicts
who are gravely ill will not be executed,10 2 it would seem even more
repulsive to put to death one whose disease is mental rather than
physical. Also, it is suggested that it is not humane to take the
life of one who cannot help himself,1' though it is doubtful that
such a person would experience more anguish than one who is fully
conscious of his fate. A more substantial objection is that, but
for the insanity, the prisoner might have been able to present some
justification for postponing or preventing his execution.'"° But this
possibility becomes more remote when a reasonable period elapses
between conviction and the onset of irrationality. Finally, it is ap-
parent that one who is insane cannot prepare himself for life after
death. This circumstance is probably the source of the common law
rule, :0 5 and it is a factor which must be considered whenever
capital punishment is involved.
From a procedural viewpoint, the post-conviction insanity plea
presents a particularly awkward problem. The interest in pre-
serving substance conflicts with the desire to expedite administra-
tion. At common law the method of trying this plea was left to the
discretion of the sentencing court. 00 Legislative enactments have
left this basic procedural principle intact. Although some statutes
provide for a hearing in the event that a prima facie case of insanity
is made out, most of the states still leave the question to the court's
considered determination. 0 7
100. See 1 Stanford L. Rev. 134 (1948). This brief article represents
a thoughtful study of the reasons behind the rule against executing the insane.
101. See Micbaelsen, Post-Conviction Due Process Regarding Insanity
Claim Prior to Execution, 41 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 639, 643 (1951).
102. See Arnold, Symbols of Government 11-12 (1935).
103. Co. Third Inst. *6 (1797).
104. See 1 Chitty, Criminal Law *761 (1847).
105. See Comment, 23 So. Calif. L. Rev. 246, 252 (1950).
106. In re Smith, 25 N. M. 48, 176 Pac. 819 (1918); see Note, 49
A. L. R. 804 (1927).
107. See the compilation of state statutes in the Appendix to Justice
Frankfurter's opinion in the Solesbee case, 339 U. S. 9, 26 (1950).
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NOTES
In the Solesbee case, the Supreme Court reduced the due process
restrictions on post-conviction procedures to an absolute minimum.
In holding constitutional the Georgia procedure giving the gov-
ernor exclusive authority over insanity pending execution, 08 the
Court swept away all doubt as to whether a judicial hearing could
be dispensed with. °"' The Court had previously denied the existence
of any right to confront or cross-examine witnesses in proceedings
after trial, and had asserted that due process requires fewer safe-
guards after an offender's guilt has been established than before." 0
The Solesbee opinion makes it extremely doubtful that the due
process clause has any effect at all on post-conviction procedures.
Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in the Solesbee case, is prepared
to forego a full judicial hearing for the convicted criminal, but he
believes that the accepted due process requirements of notice and
opportunity to be heard should be observed and that the insanity
plea calls for an inquiry which is "fair in relation to the issue for
determination."'" In addition, he. very properly points out that if
there is a constitutional right involved, administrative convenience
cannot justify its denial. 1 2 In short, Justice Frankfurter is fully
aware that a right which is given no more procedural protection than
that which the majority of the court would insist upon is an empty
guarantee.
At this stage of the proceedings there is no further question
of a right to a jury trial or a privilege against self-incrimination,
since the issue of guilt has been decided. The post-sentence hearing,
if one is provided, is not a criminal proceeding, but rather is collateral
thereto, a special proceeding of civil nature to determine the pris-
oner's mental status." 3 Generally, no appeal is authorized or allowed
from the post-conviction determination of insanity," 4 although the
suggestion has been made" that the court's order may be the kind
108. Ga. Code Ann. § 27-2602 (1936).
109. The doubt was created by language in Phyle v. Duffy, 334 U. S.
431 (1948), which appeared to modify the holding in Nobles v. Georgia, 168
U. S. 398 (1897), that a judicial hearing was not necessary.
110. See Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241, 250-252 (1949); see
Siipola v. Ness, 90 F. Supp. 18, 21 (W.D. Wash. 1950).
111. 339 U. S.9,24 (1950).
112. Id. at 25. The experience in states in which a judicial hearing is
prescribed by statute has demonstrated that the fear of a serious delay of
justice is unfounded. See Drinan, The State and Insane Condemned Criminals,
12 Jurist 92, 95 (1952).
113. See People v. Riley, 37 Cal. 2d 510, 518, 235 P. 2d 381, 386 (1951).
114. Weihofen, op. cit. supra note 92, at 395.
115. People v. Riley, 37 Cal. 2d 510, 519, 235 P. 2d 381, 387 (dissenting
opinion).
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of "order in a special proceeding" made appealable by statute in a
number of jurisdictions."16
If one who becomes insane after conviction regains sufficient
mental capacity to warrant his submission to the penalty imposed
by law, he will be returned tc. the court and delivered up for
execution.1' 7 Again, the doctrines of the Solesbee case would negate
any duty of the court to provide for a judicial determination of res-
toration.
B. Non-Capital Cases
Where the sentence imposed involves a prison term, the mental
capacity of the prisoner is only material in deciding which of two
institutions can most effectively rehabilitate him. In this situation,
as contrasted with those considered above, it is usually the pris-
oner who is urging his sanity, but there is no constitutional right
to go to a prison rather than to a mental hospital.
When a criminal is committed to a hospital for observation and
treatment pursuant to statute, the period of commitment is con-
sidered as part of the term of incarceration, so that if the prisofner's
mental health is restored, he need only serve the balance of his term
in prison." 8 However, if the term of the sentence should expire
before competency has been regained, the prisoner will ordinarily
be retained in confinement until such time as it becomes safe to
return him to the community?' 9 The state is regarded as the
guardian of all those committed to its custody, and it has authority
to administer its charges as it sees fit within the ambit delineated
by the Constitution.120 The disposition of a convict who is not
subject to the death penalty is a matter of judicial or administrative
discretion and is generally not a proper subject for judicial review. 121
CONCLUSION
It is well to remember that "medical insanity" alone is not
enough to stay the impact of -the criminal law on an offender.
Mental disorder is only relevant in criminal prosecutions to the
extent that it prevents the accused from distinguishing between
right and wrong, from maintaining his defense, or from understand-
116. See, e.g., Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 963 (Supp. 1951); Minn. Stat.§ 605.09(7) (1949).
117. Weihofen, op. cit. supra note 92, at 391.
118. Weihofen and Overholser, Comnmitment of the Mentally II, 24 Tex.
L. Rev. 307, 329 (1946).
119. Cf. Estabrook v. King, 119 F. 2d 607, 610 (8th Cir. 1941).
120. See Higgins v. McGrath, 98 F. Supp. 670, 674 (W.D. Mo. 1951).
121. DeSilva v. State, 98 Tex. Cr. Rep. 499, 267 S. W. 271 (1924).
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ing the reason for his punishment. But it is apparent that the courts
are not qualified to detect the existence of psychological handicaps.
Consequently, it is gratifying to observe a definite trend toward
the utilization of psychiatric skills in the disposition of offenders
in the criminal courts of America.
The constitutional law of criminal insanity, particularly at the
post-conviction stage, must remain somewhat conjectural, pending
further clarification of the content of due process by the Supreme
Court. It is to be hoped that the Court will not seek to postpone
decision on a matter which affects an increasingly large number of
criminal trials annally. Speculation has no place in the criminal
law. In the vords of Justice Frankfurter, "'Where life is at stake one
cannot be too careful. I's had better be dotted and t's crossed.' 2 2
122. See Phyle v. Duffy, 334 U. S. 431, 444 (1948) (concurring op-
inion).
